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ABSTRACT 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993–2009, we provide evidence that 
the sensitivity of a chief financial officer’s (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is 
significantly and positively related to the firm’s future stock price crash risk. In contrast, 
we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option 
sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and 
crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a 
high level of financial leverage. 
 
JEL classification: D89, G12, G17, G34, M52 
Keywords: Equity incentives; Crash risk; Compensation; Corporate governance; CFO 
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1. Introduction 
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations creates a conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executive 
compensation contracts are one potential mechanism for aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers. However, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) show that during the 
1970s and 1980s, corporate managers were not paid for performance but were 
compensated, like bureaucrats, based on the size of the organization. Furthermore, Jensen 
(1993) argues that such inefficient executive pay schemes created empire-building 
incentives, which exacerbated the excess capacity problem that had emerged since 19731 
and contributed to the widespread value destruction by corporate America during the era. 
To address this problem of empire building, Jensen and Murphy (1990a) recommend 
increasing the use of equity-based compensation, which they believe to be an effective 
tool for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders by exposing managers’ 
wealth to their firms’ stock prices. Perhaps partially inspired by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990a), the use of stock- and option-based compensation increased dramatically during 
the 1990s. 2  Arguably, this shift in compensation structure toward greater pay for 
performance may have discouraged managerial empire-building behavior and contributed 
to the enormous value creation by U.S. corporations in the 1990s. 
However, the solution to yesterday’s problem can sow the seeds of today’s 
problem. The widespread use of equity-based compensation coincides with several recent 
catastrophic events, including the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s, the 2001–2002 
                                                 
1 Jensen (1993) describes the year 1973 as the beginning of the “Third Industrial Revolution.” 
2 Other possible drivers for the increasing level of stock options include tax rules introduced in 1994 
(Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code), the accounting treatment of stock options (the “intrinsic 
value” method), and the lack of cash flows of new economy firms. See Hall and Murphy (2003) for more 
discussions on this issue.   
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corporate scandals, and the recent financial crisis. This unfortunate coincidence has led 
regulators, the media, and academics to question whether the large portfolios of stocks 
and options held by managers were the culprit in these financial disasters. Specifically, 
there is an argument that the high sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price afforded 
by stock option holdings motivates managers to engage in short-termist behavior to 
inflate current share prices at the expense of long-term firm value (Bebchuk, 2009). The 
primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether equity incentives, particularly 
stock option incentives, are related to future firm-specific stock price crash risk. 
Using a dynamic rational expectations model with asymmetric information, 
Benmelech et al. (2010) show that stock-based compensation not only induces managers 
to exert costly effort, but also incentivizes them to conceal bad news about future growth 
options. Such concealment of bad news can lead to severe overvaluation and a 
subsequent crash in stock price. While bad news hoarding is a somewhat unintended 
consequence of the compensation contract in the Benmelech et al. (2010) framework, 
Bolton et al. (2006) present a multiperiod agency model showing that incumbent 
investors use stock-based compensation to intentionally encourage managers to adopt 
short-termist behavior to boost the speculative component of the share price. The key 
tension of this model is the conflict of interest between the incumbent investors and 
future generations of investors. Although based on somewhat different underlying 
assumptions, the models of both Benmelech et al. (2010) and Bolton et al. (2006) predict 
that equity incentives induce managers to engage in short-termist behavior, such as bad 
news hoarding, to inflate short-term share price. 
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Though not focusing on equity incentives, Jin and Myers (2006) and Bleck and 
Liu (2007) offer more analysis of how bad news hoarding can lead to stock price crashes. 
For example, Jin and Myers (2006) argue that there is an upper limit to the amount of bad 
news that managers can absorb or successfully accumulate. When the accumulated bad 
news reaches this upper limit, it will come out all at once, leading to a large and sudden 
price decline. Moreover, Bleck and Liu (2007) argue that hiding bad news prevents 
investors and the board of directors from discerning negative net present value (NPV) 
projects at an early stage and forcing managers to take timely abandonment actions. As a 
result, the bad performance of negative NPV projects accumulates and eventually 
materializes, which results in asset price crashes. 
This study conducts a simple test to show whether the predicted (positive) relation 
between equity incentives and crash risk is consistent with real world data. Our empirical 
strategy involves the identification of an empirical proxy for managers in the bad news 
hoarding and crash story. Previous empirical research on managerial compensation has 
largely focused on chief executive officers (CEO). However, recent research provides 
evidence suggesting that the incentives of chief financial officers (CFO) could be more 
influential in a decision setting where sophisticated financial expertise is required. For 
example, Jiang et al. (2010) find that CFO equity incentives are more important than 
CEO incentives in determining earnings management. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) 
show that while CEO incentives are associated with capital structure and cash holding 
decisions, CFO incentives dominate in debt maturity choices and earnings smoothing 
decisions. Because our predicted link between equity incentives and crash risk is largely 
built on the manipulation of information flow by managers, we expect that CFO 
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incentives play a more important role in this setting. However, Benmelech et al. (2010), 
Kedia and Philippon (2009), and McNichols and Stubben (2008), among others, argue 
that managers also hide bad news by mimicking the investment behavior of firms with 
truly high growth potential. Thus, CEO incentives may also be significant because we 
expect CEOs to be more influential in investment decisions. Therefore, the differential 
impact of CFOs’ versus CEOs’ incentives on crash risk is an empirical question. 
Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), we measure the strength of 
CEO/CFO equity-based incentives as the dollar change in the value of the stock or option 
holdings of a CEO/CFO given a one-percentage-point increase in the company stock 
price. Firm-level crash risk is proxied by the probability of extreme, negative firm-
specific weekly returns, the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, and the 
asymmetric volatility of negative and positive stock returns (Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et 
al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011). Using a sample of U.S. firms from the Compustat Executive 
Compensation database (ExecuComp) during the period 1993–2009, we find that the 
strength of CFO option incentives is significantly and positively related to future stock 
price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence that the strength of CEO option 
incentives is positively related to crash risk. More importantly, we find that CFO option 
incentives dominate CEO option incentives in determining future crash risk when we 
include both CFO and CEO option incentives in the regression. This result suggests that 
CFOs are more influential in firms’ bad news hoarding decisions. 
Theoretical analyses such as that of Benmelech et al. (2010) do not discriminate 
between option and stock incentives. However, we find no significant empirical relation 
between the strength of stock incentives and crash risk. This result is consistent with 
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Burns and Kedia (2006), who find that option incentives, but not stock incentives, have a 
significant impact on a firm’s misreporting. Thus, these results suggest that option 
holdings provide more powerful incentives for managers to inflate short-term share prices, 
possibly because the loss to manager wealth from option holdings is limited in the event 
of a stock price crash. 
Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) find that the incentive provided by a firm’s 
corporate governance system matters only if the firm operates in non-competitive 
industries. The authors suggest that researchers take into consideration the disciplining 
role of the product market when examining the consequence of corporate governance 
arrangements. Following their suggestion, we conduct subsample analysis for firms with 
high and low product market competition. Consistent with the argument that agency 
problems are more severe for non-competitive industries, we find that the positive 
relation between CFO option incentives and crash risk is significant only for the 
subsample of firms in non-competitive industries. 
Finally, some regulators and academics argue that excessive risk taking induced 
by stock options contributed to the recent financial crisis (e.g., Bebchuk, 2009). 
Motivated by this argument, we examine whether the sensitivity of option portfolio 
values to stock return volatility (i.e., vega) is positively related to crash risk. However, 
we find no evidence of such a relation. Expanding on our bad news hoarding story, we 
conjecture that the hiding of excessive risk taking rather than risk taking itself leads to 
crashes.3 Using financial leverage as a proxy for the ex ante incentive to mask risk taking, 
we show that the positive relation between CFO option incentives and crash risk exists 
                                                 
3 Here, excessive risk taking is considered to be bad news, because the disclosure of it can depress stock 
prices.  
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only for the subsample of firms with high leverage (i.e., firms with high ex ante incentive 
to mask risks).4  
This study contributes to the literature by identifying a perverse effect of option-
based compensation: it can increase future stock price crash risk. The results in this paper 
are largely supportive of the predictions of the theoretical model of Benmelech et al. 
(2010), with two important differences. First, Benmelech et al. (2010) predict that both 
stock and option incentives can increase crash risk, while we find that only option 
incentives matter empirically. Second, Benmelech et al. (2010) do not discriminate 
between CEO and CFO incentives, while we find that CFOs’ option incentives dominate 
those of CEOs in determining crash risk. This difference between CEO and CFO 
incentives has attracted increasing attention from the recent literature, partially motivated 
by the recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule of requiring the disclosure 
of CFO pay (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). 
Our study also extends a long and large literature on the relation between equity 
incentives and firm performance or firm value (Core et al., 2003; Frydman and Jenter, 
2010; Murphy, 1999). Using accounting return or Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm 
performance, this literature, in general, finds some inconclusive evidence, partly due to 
difficulties in research design. 5  Instead of focusing on the average and concurrent 
valuation effect, we examine the impact of equity incentives on future extreme outcomes. 
This exercise can add significantly to the literature, because extreme outcomes reflect an 
                                                 
4 Financial leverage could be a proxy for many other things, we thus suggest that readers exercise 
caution in accepting our explanations. Please refer to Section 4.3.3 for more details on the motivation, the 
design, and the limitation of this test. 
5 Section 2 provides a short review of this literature. 
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extraordinary cumulative effect that can provide more valuable insight into the true 
nature of a phenomenon (Kim et al., 2011; Taleb, 2007). 
This paper is closely related to those of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns 
and Kedia (2006), and Jiang et al. (2010), which link CEO or CFO equity incentives to 
earnings management. However, our study provides additional insights into this literature, 
because earnings management is only one of many ways for managers to withhold bad 
news (Hutton et al., 2009).6 For example, Kim et al. (2011) argue that managers can also 
hide bad news through complex tax shelters. In our empirical tests, we explicitly control 
for earnings management and find that the relation between option incentives and crash 
risk remains significant. 
Finally, our research is related to the emerging literature examining the causes for 
the recent financial crisis, although our investigation is more general and does not focus 
on the crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) investigate whether bank performance during 
the crisis is related to CEO incentives before the crisis and find evidence that CEOs with 
stronger equity incentives performed worse during the financial crisis for a sample of 
large banks.7 Our results of the positive relation between managers’ incentives and crash 
risk are somewhat consistent with these authors’ findings. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 conducts a review 
of the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of key 
                                                 
6 In addition, some recent studies fail to find a significant positive relation between equity incentives 
and misreporting (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Erickson et al., 2006). Thus, mixed evidence of the relation 
between equity incentives and earnings management also makes our study more necessary. Moreover, the 
financial statement’s bottom line is only one of many ways of conveying information (Lambert, 2010). 
7 In particular, the authors find that banks with a larger “dollar gain from +1%” (a measure similar to 
the equity incentive measures in our paper) had significantly lower stock and accounting performance 
during the crisis. 
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variables. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 presents our 
conclusions. 
 
2. Related literature and empirical predictions 
Stock and option holdings tie managers’ wealth to a firm’s stock price, and have 
long been viewed as an effective tool to align managers’ incentives to shareholder 
interests. One of the underlying assumptions for this belief is that stock price is an 
unbiased indicator of the firm’s fundamental value. However, there is both anecdotal and 
empirical evidence showing that managers can manipulate market expectations and that a 
firm’s stock price can deviate from its fundamental value for an extended period of time 
(Peng and Roell, 2008). For example, Enron’s managers were able to conceal Enron’s 
bad performance through means such as earnings management, tax sheltering, and related 
party transactions, which led the market to overvalue Enron’s stock for a prolonged 
period in the late 1990s. Empirically, Sloan (1996) shows that managers can manipulate 
the share price through accounting accruals. The above evidence suggests that equity 
incentives can have the perverse effect of inducing managers to inflate a firm’s short-
term share price without improving its true underlying performance. 
Recent literature on the consequences of equity incentives has focused on 
earnings management. The maintained assumption of this line of research is that 
managers can successfully inflate share prices by manipulating financial statement 
bottom lines.8 Cheng and Warfield (2005), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and 
Kedia (2006), and Efendi et al. (2007), among others, show a positive relation between 
                                                 
8 Jiang et al. (2010) provide evidence that CFO incentives to manipulate earnings are stronger for firms 
with higher return-earnings relations. 
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CEO equity incentives and earnings management. More recently, Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) provide an important extension to this line of 
research by showing that CFO incentives dominate CEO incentives in determining 
earnings management. Admittedly, the evidence in the literature is not unanimous. For 
instance, Erickson et al. (2006) find no significant positive relation between executive 
equity incentives and accounting irregularities. Moreover, Armstrong et al. (2010) find a 
modest negative relation between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud. The 
mixed evidence above may reflect the difficulties in capturing managerial earnings 
management behavior empirically, a problem that has long been recognized by the 
accounting literature (Dechow et al., 2010). 
A number of earlier studies examine the relation between equity incentives and 
firm value, again producing mixed results. Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) show nonmonotonic relations between managerial ownership and firm 
value. Mehran (1995) finds that firm performance is positively related to the percentage 
of equity held by management and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-
based. Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) find a positive relation between firm value and CEO 
stock holdings, but a negative relation between firm value and option holdings. In 
contrast, Himmelberg et al. (1999) find no relation between managerial ownership and 
firm performance after controlling for firm fixed effects. However, Zhou (2001) argues 
that fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of managerial ownership on 
performance, even if the effect exists, because fixed effects estimation relies on within-
firm variations and managerial ownership typically changes slowly over time within a 
firm. 
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This paper extends the prior research by examining the relation between equity 
incentives and future stock price crash risk. Our empirical exercise is mainly motivated 
by the theoretical predictions in the model of Benmelech et al. (2010). Using a hidden 
action model, the authors show that equity incentives induce managers to conceal bad 
news about future growth options, and this bad news hoarding by managers leads to an 
overvaluation of a firm’s stock, which eventually results in a crash of the stock price. In a 
similar vein, Jin and Myers (2006) show analytically that the hoarding and accumulation 
of bad news for an extended period lead to an abrupt decline in stock price when a 
tipping point is crossed. 
Moreover, managers’ short-termist behaviors are not limited to the manipulation 
of financial information. To support the pretense of strong investment opportunities, 
managers can also choose suboptimal investment policies (Benmelech et al., 2010; 
McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Kedia and Philippon, 2009). For instance, McNichols and 
Stubben (2008) find that managers over-invest in property, plant, and equipment in the 
period of overstated earnings. Similarly, Kedia and Philippon (2009) show that during 
periods of inflated performance, firms hire and invest excessively. In Benmelech et al.’s 
(2010) theoretical model, the suboptimal investment policy after the slowdown in growth 
rate eventually leads to undercapitalization and a stock price crash.   
Based on Benmelech et al. (2010), we predict that managerial equity incentives 
are positively related to future crash risk. In addition, our empirical exercise also 
incorporates recent developments in the executive compensation literature. Specifically, 
following Jiang et al. (2010), we separately and jointly examine the association between 
CFO and CEO equity incentives and crash risk. Fuller and Jensen (2010) argue that 
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increasing the proportion of stock options in executive compensation makes the 
preservation and enhancement of short-term stock price a personal priority for both CEOs 
and CFOs. Jiang et al. (2010) find that CFO equity incentives are more strongly related to 
earnings management than CEO equity incentives. Moreover, Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) argue that CFOs are more influential in decisions requiring financial expertise, 
such as earnings smoothing. Thus, there is a reason to expect CFO equity incentives to 
have a different effect on crash risk from that of CEO equity incentives, because bad 
news hoarding requires financial expertise and CFOs are generally in direct charge of 
processing financial information about the firm and disseminating it to the stock market. 
However, Feng et al. (2011) argue that CFOs are simply CEOs’ agents and that they 
engage in accounting manipulations because of CEO pressure. Thus, it is an empirical 
question whether CEO or CFO incentives matter more in determining bad news hoarding 
and crash risk. 
Drawing on the findings of prior research, we also separately examine the 
incentives induced by stock holdings and option holdings. Peng and Roell (2008) 
analytically show that options have a more powerful impact than stock awards on 
managers’ incentives to engage in share price manipulation, given their higher pay-
performance elasticity. Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that option holdings create a more 
powerful incentive than stock holdings for managers to inflate short-term share prices at 
the expense of long-term value. This is because the loss to option holdings is limited 
when future price declines occur. In contrast, the payoff from stock holdings has a 
symmetric relation to share price, which exposes managers’ wealth to price declines as 
well as price appreciation. Thus, we expect that, compared to stock holdings, option 
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holdings induce more aggressive bad news hoarding behavior by managers, which, in 
turn, leads to higher future crash risk. 
 
3. Data and variable measurement 
3.1. Data 
The initial sample consists of firm-year observations in the ExecuComp database 
during the period 1993–2009. We then delete observations with missing Compustat 
accounting data and missing Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) price, return, 
and trading volume data. We also exclude firms with a year-end share price that is lower 
than $1. The final sample includes 29,638 firm-year observations. The exact number of 
observations used in our regression analyses varies, depending on the data requirement 
for the variables included in the regression. Table 1 presents a comparison of annual 
observations as well as the percentage of firms experiencing crashes for the Compustat 
universe and the ExecuComp sample. It shows that about 30% of Compustat firms are 
covered by the ExecuComp database. In addition, Table 1 shows a slightly higher crash 
frequency for firms in the ExecuComp database than those in the Compustat universe. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2. Measuring firm-specific crash risk 
This study employs three measures of crash risk, which are constructed following 
previous studies in the crash risk literature. Since we are interested in firm-specific 
factors that contribute to firm-specific crash risk, we first estimate firm-specific weekly 
returns for each firm and year. Specifically, we define the firm-specific weekly return, 
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denoted by W, as the natural log of one plus the residual return from the expanded market 
model regression9 
           jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr   2,51,4,31,22,1, ,                (1) 
where ,jr  is the return on stock j in week  , and ,mr  is the return on the CRSP value-
weighted market index in week  . We include the lead and lag terms for the market 
index return to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The firm-specific 
weekly return for firm j in week  , ,jW , is measured by the natural log of one plus the 
residual return in Eq. (1), that is, )1ln( .,   jjW  . 
Following Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011), this paper defines crash 
weeks in a given fiscal year for a given firm as those weeks during which the firm 
experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-
specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year. The first measure of crash likelihood 
for each firm in each year, denoted by CRASH, is an indicator variable that equals one for 
a firm-year that experiences one or more crash weeks (as defined above) during the 
fiscal-year period, and zero otherwise. 
 The second measure of crash risk is the negative conditional return skewness 
(NCSKEW) measure of Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2011). Specifically, NCSKEW 
for a given firm in a fiscal year is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment 
of firm-specific weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Specifically, for each 
firm j in year t, we compute NCSKEW as 
                                                 
9 All the empirical results are qualitatively unchanged if we also include industry index return (and its 
lead and lag terms) in the expanded market model (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009). Results are available upon 
request. 
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    232323 )2)(1()1(    jjjt WnnWnnNCSKEW .                          (2) 
 
The third measure we use is the down-to-up volatility (DUVOL) measure of crash 
likelihood from Chen et al. (2001), which is computed as follows. For each firm j over a 
fiscal-year period t, we separate all the weeks with firm-specific weekly returns below the 
annual mean (“down” weeks) from those with firm-specific returns above the annual 
mean (“up” weeks) and calculate the standard deviation for each of these subsamples 
separately. Then, the DUVOL measure is the log of the ratio of the standard deviation on 
the down weeks to the standard deviation on the up weeks. 
3.3. Measurement of equity incentives 
We use Bergstresser and Philippon’s (2006) incentive ratio to measure the 
strength of CEO and CFO incentives from stock holdings and option holdings. 
Specifically, the incentive ratio for option holdings is calculated as 
,)( ,,,,,, tititititi BONUSSALARYONEPCTONEPCTINCENTIVE               (3) 
where ONEPCT is the dollar change in the value of a manager’s option holdings that 
would come from a one-percentage-point increase in the company stock price (i.e., 0.01 × 
share price × option delta × number of options). Following Core and Guay (2002), the 
options delta is estimated separately for each of the following three groups of options 
using the Black–Scholes formula: newly granted options in the current year, options 
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granted in previous years but not yet exercisable, and options granted in previous years 
that are currently exercisable.10 
The incentive ratio for stock holdings is calculated similarly as in Eq. (3). As 
discussed, we estimate the incentive ratios separately for CEOs and CFOs. The 
compensation data for CEOs are extracted from the ExecuComp database using the data 
item CEOANN = CEO. Following Jiang et al. (2010), we obtain CFO data from 
ExecuComp using the data item TITLEANN. 11  Because ExecuComp only contains 
compensation data for the top five highest paid executives, including the CEO, not all 
firms in the database have CFO compensation data. Therefore, for the sample of firms 
with both CEO and CFO data, the CFO is likely to be relatively more influential than 
firms without CFO data in ExecuComp. To address this potential sample selection bias, 
we report the regression results for both the sample with only CEO data (the “CEO 
sample”) and the sample with both CEO and CFO data (the “CEO–CFO sample”). 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression 
analysis. Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the CEO sample. The 
mean value for CRASH is 0.172, suggesting that the unconditional probability of a firm-
specific stock price crash event during a year is 17.2%. The option and stock incentive 
ratios for an average CEO in the CEO sample are 0.113 and 0.160, respectively. 
                                                 
10 We do not describe the detailed procedures here, since we use exactly the same procedure as that of 
Core and Guay (2002). 
11 We classify managers as CFOs if their title includes any of the following terms: CFO, chief financial 
officer, treasurer, controller, finance, and vp-finance. 
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Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the CEO–CFO sample. 
The option and stock incentive ratios for an average CEO in this sample are 0.115 and 
0.154, respectively, which are similar in magnitude to those for the CEO sample. The 
option and stock incentive ratios for an average CFO in this sample are 0.072 and 0.037, 
respectively. The stock incentive ratio of CEOs is much larger than that of CFOs. In 
contrast, the difference between CEOs’ and CFOs’ option incentive ratios is relatively 
small. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 4.2. Main regression analysis 
To examine the relation between managers’ equity incentives and future stock 
price crash risk, we employ the following regression: 
    .**
'
10   iablesControlVarINCENTIVECrashRisk        (4) 
In Eq. (4), when crash risk is proxied by CRASH, a logit regression is used, and when 
crash risk is proxied by NCSKEW or DUVOL, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
are used. The dependent variable in Eq. (4) is measured in year t, while the independent 
variables are measured in year t - 1. Following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009), 
we include a set of control variables that are deemed to be potential predictors of crash 
risk. The variable DTURN is the detrended stock trading volume, which is a proxy for 
investor heterogeneity, or the difference of opinions among investors, in Chen et al. 
(2001). The authors find that firms with high stock turnovers are more crash prone. The 
variable NCSKEW is the negative skewness of past firm-specific stock returns, which is 
included to capture the potential persistence of the third moment of stock returns. The 
variable SIGMA is the standard deviation of past firm-specific stock returns. Chen et al. 
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(2001) argue that more volatile stocks are more likely to crash in the future. Here RET is 
the average firm-specific weekly return over the past year. Chen et al. (2001) find that 
firms with high past returns are more likely to crash. Following Hutton et al. (2009), we 
also include the standard control variables firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), 
financial leverage (LEV), and return on assets (ROA). In all regressions, we also include 
industry and year dummies to control for industry and time fixed effects. 
In the regression, we also include BONUS as a control variable, which is the 
CEO/CFO bonus in the current year scaled by cash salary (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2010). 
Prior research argues that managers’ bonus plans can also induce short-termist behavior 
(Healy, 1985). This paper focuses on the effect of equity incentives, particularly, option 
incentives; we therefore make BONUS only a control variable. Core and Guay (1999) 
argue that most managers’ incentives stem from the existing portfolio of stocks and 
options, and not from annual pay. Finally, we also control for earnings management using 
absolute abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). Hutton 
et al. (2009) find that accrual management increases future crash risk and Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006) find that managers’ equity incentives are positively related to 
accrual manipulation. Thus, we control for accrual management to make sure that our 
results regarding the relation between equity incentives and crash risk is not simply 
driven by accrual management. Our theoretical prediction is built on the notion that 
equity incentives induce managers to engage in short-termist behavior to inflate share 
prices, such as bad news hoarding. Note, however, that accrual manipulation is only one 
potential way to hide bad news. That being said, accrual manipulation is also part of our 
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line of reasoning. Untabulated robustness results show that all the regression results are 
similar, even if we exclude abnormal accruals from the equation. 
Table 3 presents the regression results. Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of 
the logit model regressions, and Panels B and C report those of the OLS regressions. The 
t-statistics below the coefficient estimates are based on robust standard errors corrected 
for firm and year clustering (Thompson, 2011). As noted previously, we report the results 
separately for both the CEO and CEO–CFO samples. 
Column 1 of Panels A to C of Table 3 presents the results for the CEO sample, 
where CEO option and stock incentives are the key variables of interest. We can see that 
CEO option incentives are positively related to future crash risk, and this positive relation 
is highly significant in the OLS regressions where NCSKEW and DUVOL are used as the 
proxies for crash risk (Panels B and C). However, it is not significant in the logit model 
specification where CRASH is the dependent variable (Panel A). The coefficients for 
CEO stock incentives are not significant for all of column 1 of Panels A to C of Table 3. 
Columns 2 to 4 of Table 3 present the results for the CEO–CFO sample. Column 
2 repeats the regressions in column 1 using this reduced sample with CFO data and 
shows much less significant relations between CEO option incentives and crash risk. The 
relation between CEO stock incentives and crash risk continues to be insignificant. 
Now, we turn our attention to the CFOs. Column 3 of Panels A to C of Table 3 
reports the regression results where CFO option and stock incentives are the key variable 
of interest. We can see that CFO option incentives are positively and significantly 
associated with future crash risk for all three crash risk measures. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are much larger than those of the CEO option incentives reported in column 
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2. However, similar to the findings for the CEOs, the CFOs’ stock incentives are not 
related to crash risk. 
Finally, in column 4 of Panels A to C of Table 3, we include CEO and CFO 
incentives jointly into the regression models. Interestingly, we find that only CFO option 
incentives are significantly related to future crash risk, and CEO option incentives 
become insignificant for all three measures of crash risk. Thus, we conclude that CFO 
option incentives dominate CEO option incentives in predicting future crash risk. We 
interpret this result as evidence that CFOs are more influential in the bad news hoarding 
behavior of a firm because of their expertise in financial arrangements and disclosure. 
This is consistent with recent studies that compare CEO and CFO equity incentives and 
firms’ finance and disclosure decisions (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Jiang et al., 
2010). However, we cannot rule out the possibility that this result is driven by the 
selection bias of ExecuComp including only the top five highest paid executives. That is, 
for the sample of firms with CFO data, it is likely that CFOs are more influential than for 
the sample of firms without CFO data. 
In sum, we find strong evidence that CFO option incentives are positively related 
to future crash risk, and weaker evidence that CEO option incentives are also positively 
related to future crash risk. In addition, with caveats, we show that CFO option incentives 
dominate CEO option incentives in determining future crash risk. Finally, neither CEO 
nor CFO stock incentives are related to crash risk. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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4.3. Additional analysis 
4.3.1. Abnormal option incentives 
Burns and Kedia (2006) conjecture that there is a desired level of option 
incentives that can increase firm value. Excessive option incentives above the desired 
level can cause dysfunctional effects such as misreporting. This section estimates the 
abnormal level of CEO or CFO option sensitivity following the model of Core and Guay 
(1999) and examines whether it is related to crash risk. Specifically, the abnormal level of 
option incentives is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of CEO/CFO option 
incentives on the market value of equity, idiosyncratic risk, the book-to-market ratio, 
CEO/CFO tenure, free cash flow, and industry dummies.12 
Table 4 reports the regression results that replace CEO/CFO option incentives 
with the abnormal level of CEO/CFO option incentives (i.e., ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO 
and ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CFO). Table 4 shows that only the abnormal CFO option 
incentive is significantly and positively related to future crash risk. Although we expect 
the coefficients of abnormal option sensitivity in Table 4 to be greater than those of 
option sensitivity in Table 3, we find that this is not the case. However, this result is 
somewhat similar in spirit to the study of Burns and Kedia (2006), which also finds no 
evidence that abnormal option incentives are more strongly related to misreporting than 
total option incentives. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
12 Similar to Core and Guay (1999), we find CEOs’ option incentives to be significantly positively 
associated with firm size, idiosyncratic risk, and CEO tenure. We find a negative but insignificant 
coefficient for both the book-to-market and the indicator for a free cash flow problem. The results for the 
CFO option incentive regression are similar to those for the CEO option incentive regression, except that 
the coefficient of the book-to-market is significantly negative. 
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4.3.2. The effect of product market competition 
Economists have long argued that competitive pressure from the product market 
can incentivize managers to maximize long-term firm value by forcing unprofitable firms 
out of the business (Machlup, 1967). This argument motivates Giroud and Mueller (2010, 
2011) to predict that the incentive provided by a firm’s corporate governance system 
matters only if the firm operates in non-competitive industries. Consistent with their 
prediction, Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) find that the value-enhancing role of the 
corporate control market is significant only for firms facing low product market 
competition. Drawing on this recent literature, we now extend our main analysis to 
examine whether the impacts of equity incentives on crash risk are different for firms in 
competitive and non-competitive industries. 
Following Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011), we measure product market 
competition using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). A high HHI indicates low 
product market competition. Specifically, the HHI is computed as 
,
1
2


jN
i
ijtjt SHHI          (5) 
where Sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed 
based on firm sales. We estimate HHI for each of the Fama–French 48 industry 
classifications. Based on the magnitude of HHI, we classify firms into either a low 
product market competition group (above-median HHI) or a high product market 
competition group (below-median HHI). 
Table 5 displays the subsample regressions of crash risk on equity incentives for 
low and high product market competition groups. Similar to our main analysis, the 
coefficients for CEO option incentives are largely insignificant for both the low and high 
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competition groups. Interestingly, we find that the coefficients for CFO option incentives 
are significant only for firms in low product market competition industries. This result is 
consistent with the argument and findings of Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011), 
suggesting that option incentives have the perverse effect of increasing crash risk only for 
firms in non-competitive industries. 
The results presented in Table 5 are also consistent with recent disclosure theories 
that incorporate the interaction between the capital market and the product market. For 
example, Evans and Sridhar (2002) argue that when the product market and the capital 
market use the same set of disclosures, the offsetting demands from the two markets can 
enhance disclosure quality. For example, managers’ incentives to inflate share price by 
withholding bad news can be dampened by competitive pressures from the product 
market. This is because the timely disclosure of bad news can discourage competition and 
overproduction by firms in the same industry. Li (2010) empirically shows that product 
market competition enhances disclosure quality by reducing the optimism in profit 
forecasts. 
Overall, the findings in this section have implications for the design of managers’ 
compensation contracts. Specifically, regulators or firms should take into consideration 
the disciplining role of product market competition when regulating and designing 
executives’ incentive pay for efficiency purposes. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.3. Stock options, risk taking, and the masking of risk taking 
One of the rationales for using equity-based compensation, especially stock 
options, is to overcome the managerial risk aversion problem and induce optimal risk 
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taking (Guay, 1999). Until now, the empirical literature has been largely consistent with 
the prediction that the use of stock options is positively related to managerial risk-taking 
behavior. For example, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that the sensitivity of the value 
of a CEO’s options to stock return volatility (i.e., vega) is positively related to 
exploration risk for a sample of oil and gas producers. Coles et al. (2006) show that 
higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (i.e., vega) induces riskier policy 
choices, including relatively more research and development investments, fewer property, 
plant, and equipment investments, more focus, and higher leverage. Finally, using the 
mid-1990s changes in the Delaware takeover regime as an exogenous shock, Low (2009) 
finds that managers of Delaware-incorporated firms, on average, decreased firm risk and 
destroyed shareholder value in response to the greater protection brought about by the 
takeover regime shift. The author also finds that increased sensitivity of CEO portfolio 
value to stock return volatility (i.e., vega) induces risk-taking behavior.13   
Although the empirical literature has held the view that stock options encourage 
optimal managerial risk taking and increase shareholder wealth, some regulators, 
practitioners, and academics blame stock options for inducing excessive managerial risk 
taking and contributing to the recent financial crisis. For example, in his testimony on the 
U.S. Treasury budget on June 9, 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner argued, 
I think that although many things caused this crisis, what happened to 
compensation and the incentives in creative risk taking did contribute in 
some institutions to the vulnerability that we saw in this financial crisis. 
                                                 
13 Recently, Cheng et al. (2009) developed a measure of residual compensation. The authors find that 
their measure of residual compensation is positively related with risk-taking measures, including firm beta, 
return volatility, tail cumulative return performance, and the sensitivity of firm stock price to the ABX 
subprime index for a sample of financial firms during 1992–2008. 
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We need to help encourage substantial reforms in compensation 
structures particularly in the financial industry. 
This section examines whether risk-taking incentives afforded by stock options 
increase future stock price crash risk for our broad sample of firm-years. Specifically, we 
regress firm-specific crash risk measures on CEO and CFO option portfolio vegas, 
controlling for option portfolio deltas and all the other control variables used in our main 
tests.14 Following Guay (1999), the option vega is calculated as the natural log of the 
dollar change in the value of executive option holdings amounting from a 1% increase in 
the firm’s stock return volatility. Table 6 reports the results. Overall, Table 6 shows no 
evidence that there is a significant positive relation between the CEO or CFO option 
portfolio vega and future stock price crash risk.15 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Our findings regarding the relation between the option vega and crash risk are 
largely consistent with the spirit of the finding of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010). Focusing 
on the banking industry, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) investigate whether bank CEO 
incentives were related to bank performance during the recent credit crisis. Though 
options have been blamed for leading to excessive risk taking, the authors find no 
evidence that greater sensitivity of CEO stock option portfolio value to stock volatility 
led to worse stock returns during the credit crisis. 
                                                 
14 Here, we follow Chava and Purnanandam (2010) to include both the log-transformed delta and vega 
to examine the risk-taking effects of stock options. Our main tests use a deflated version of delta (incentive 
ratio) following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Jiang et al. (2010), where the focus is on the price-
related incentive effect of stocks and options. 
15  Chava and Purnanandam (2010) use delta to capture managers’ risk-decreasing incentives. The 
overall positive coefficients on delta in our table may indicate that risk taking is not the contributing factor 
to crash risk. Rather, a high delta can motivate managers to mask risk taking, as discussed later. 
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Based on the findings of our study and that of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010), we 
argue that it is unlikely that option-induced managerial risk taking per se increases crash 
risk. However, given the extensive risk-taking behavior of the financial industry before 
the financial crisis, it is still early to completely rule out the role of excessive risk taking 
in creating crashes. To continue our bad news hoarding story, we conjecture that, rather 
than risk taking itself, the hiding of excessive risk-taking behavior from investors 
contributes to crash risk. If rational investors and the board of directors are aware of an 
undesired high level of managerial risk-taking behavior, they will take timely corrective 
actions to stop or constrain such risk-taking behavior. However, given that managers’ 
wealth is tied to stock price by equity incentives, managers will withhold information 
about excessive risk taking to maintain share price.16 As a result, managers take too much 
risk and the uninformed investors/boards are unable to take timely corrective actions or 
adjust price levels accordingly until a crash occurs. This line of argument seems to be 
consistent with the recent SEC investigation of the Lehman bankruptcy case. According 
to the Wall Street Journal (2010), an SEC examiner found that Lehman engaged in an 
accounting device known within the firm as ‘Repo 105’ to achieve extensive short-term 
off-balance-sheet financing, which helped Lehman look like it had less debt on its 
books.17   
The Wall Street Journal (2010) also reports that 
The SEC now is seeking detailed information from nearly two dozen 
large financial firms about repos, signaling that the agency is looking 
                                                 
16 If the perceived risk becomes higher from holding the cash flow constant, investors will adjust the 
share price downward. Thus, we argue that managers care more about the price effect (delta) of their 
decisions than the volatility effect (vega) of their decisions on option values. 
17 See Valukas (2010) for detailed explanations on the Lehman ‘Repo 105’ transactions. 
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for accounting techniques that could hide a firm’s risk-taking. The 
SEC’s inquiry follows recent disclosures that Lehman used repos to 
mask some $50 billion in debt before it collapsed in 2008. 
To investigate the possibility that option incentives contribute to crash risk by 
inducing the hiding of risk-taking behavior, we design a test to provide some indirect 
evidence. Specifically, we want to examine whether the relation between option 
incentives and crash risk is more pronounced for firms that have more ex ante incentives 
to hide risk taking. Empirically, we use the existing leverage level as a proxy for the ex 
ante incentive to hide risk taking. We argue that managers of firms with already high 
levels of leverage should worry more about investor perception of their risk-taking 
behavior and thus have stronger incentives to hide risk taking. Note that this argument is 
consistent with some observations of practitioners. For example, a former Goldman 
analyst, William Tanona, says, “You want your leverage to look better at quarter-end 
than it actually was during the quarter, to suggest that you’re taking less risk (Wall Street 
Journal, 2010).”   
Table 7 reports the subsample analysis of the relation between CEO/CFO equity 
incentives and crash risk for high- and low-leverage firms. Similar to our earlier findings, 
only CFO option incentives are significantly related to future crash risk. More 
importantly, Table 7 shows that this significantly positive relation emerges only for the 
subsample of firms with high levels of financial leverage.18 We interpret this result as 
evidence that option incentives are more strongly related to crash risk when managers’ 
                                                 
18 Product market competition and financial leverage can be correlated (e.g., Brander and Lewis, 1986; 
Chevalier, 1995; Phillips, 1995; MacKay and Phillips, 2005). Thus, it is possible that the results in Table 7 
are not that different from those in Table 5. To address this concern, we conduct Pearson's 2x2 Chi-Square 
Test of Independence for financial leverage and product market competition and find that the two splitting 
variables are independent. 
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incentives to hide risk taking are higher. It is also interesting to note that CFOs may have 
more expertise in hiding risk taking through accounting techniques such as those used by 
Lehman before its collapse. However, we suggest that readers exercise caution in 
accepting our interpretation, since leverage can be a proxy for many other things. We do 
hope our tentative evidence helps motivate future studies that examine directly whether 
hiding risk taking (rather than risk taking itself) contributes to stock price crashes. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether CEO and CFO equity incentives are associated 
with firm-specific stock price crash risk. Using a sample of U.S. firms during 1993–2009, 
we find that the incentives from CFOs’ option holdings are significantly and positively 
related to future crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence that the incentives 
from CEOs’ option holdings contribute to crash risk, and this weak effect disappears after 
the CFO option incentives are included. Moreover, we find that neither CEO stock 
incentives nor CFO stock incentives are related to crash risk. Our results are somewhat 
consistent with the theoretical prediction of Benmelech et al. (2010), that equity 
incentives induce managers to hide bad news and increase crash risk. However, while 
Benmelech et al. (2010) formulate their model with CEOs in mind, we find that CFO 
incentives matter more. This finding is consistent with the recent empirical findings of 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010), who argue that CFO incentives 
are more influential in situations where financial expertise is particularly important. 
Moreover, while the empirical implication of Benmelech et al. (2010) applies to all 
components of equity incentives, including stock and option holdings, we find that only 
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option incentives contribute significantly to crash risk. One explanation for this finding is 
that option incentives are more powerful in inducing managerial bad news hoarding 
behavior, because managers’ losses from option holdings are limited when a stock price 
crash event occurs in the future. Our empirical results suggest that it may be desirable for 
future analytical research to consider the different features of options and stocks, as well 
as the different characteristics of CFOs and CEOs, when modeling the relation between 
managerial equity incentives and stock price crash risk. 
Furthermore, we show that the positive relation between CFO option incentives 
and crash risk is more pronounced for the subsample of firms in a non-competitive 
industry. This additional evidence suggests that product market competition deters 
managerial bad news hoarding behavior. In addition, we find some tentative evidence that 
CFO option incentives and crash risk are more significant for firms with greater ex ante 
incentives to hide risk taking. 
Our results have important implications for the design and disclosure of executive 
compensation structure. As a standard solution to the agency problems in modern 
corporations, managers’ equity holdings have the potential to align the incentives of 
managers with the interests of shareholder-owners. There is empirical evidence that 
managers’ equity incentives increase firm value (e.g., Mehran, 1995). However, since the 
burst of the dot-com bubble, there is growing concern that equity incentives will lead 
managers to engage in short-termist behavior for the sake of boosting short-term share 
prices. Earlier research on the perverse effect of equity incentives has focused on CEO 
incentives and earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Partially 
motivated by recent SEC disclosure rules on CFO compensation, more recent studies 
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have begun to examine CFO incentives and earnings management (e.g., Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). However, our paper is the first empirical study 
that shows a positive relation between executive incentives and crash risk. Our findings 
suggest that boards need to take special caution in using equity incentives, particularly 
stock options, to compensate their CFOs. In addition, our results also serve to rationalize 
the SEC’s recent requirement that firms disclose the compensation packages of their 
CFOs. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables: Crash risk measures 
 
CRASH is an indicator variable that takes the value one for a firm-year that experiences one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year, with 3.2 chosen to generate frequencies of 0.1% in the normal 
distribution during the fiscal-year period, and zero otherwise. 
 
NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal-year period. 
 
DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of down-week to up-week firm-specific 
returns. 
 
For the above variables, the firm-specific weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1 + residual), where the 
residual is from the following expanded market model regression: 
 
  jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr   2,51,4,31,22,1, . 
 
Compensation variables 
INCENTIVE_OPT is the incentive ratio for executive option holdings, which is measured as 
ONEPCT_OPT/(ONEPCT_OPT+SALARY+BONUS). The variable ONEPCT_OPT (or option 
sensitivity) is the dollar change in the value of executive option holdings resulting from a 1% 
increase in the firm’s stock price. 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT is the abnormal option incentive ratio, defined similarly to INCENTV_OPT. 
We estimate abnormal option sensitivity using the methodology in Core and Guay (1999). 
Specifically, the abnormal option sensitivity is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of 
executive option sensitivity on the market value of equity, idiosyncratic risk, the book-to-market, 
executive tenure, free cash flow, and industry dummies. 
OPTDELTA is the natural log of the dollar change in the value of executive option holdings 
resulting from a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. 
OPTVEGA is the natural log of the dollar change in the value of executive option holdings 
resulting from a 1% increase in the firm’s stock volatility. 
INCENTIVE_STK is the incentive ratio for executive stock holdings, defined similarly to 
INCENTV_OPT. 
BONUS is executive bonus divided by salary. 
In the regression result tables, we denote CEO variables with the suffix _CEO after each variable, 
and CFO compensation variables with the suffix _CFO after each variable. 
 
Other control variables 
 
DTURN is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal-year period minus the 
average monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal-year period, where monthly share 
turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month. 
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SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal-year period. 
 
RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal-year period, times 100. 
 
SIZE is the log of the market value of equity. 
 
MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
 
LEV is total long-term debts divided by total assets. 
 
ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
 
ABACC is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated 
from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
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Table 1 
Yearly frequencies of stock price crash events 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the frequencies of stock price crash events for both the 
Compustat universe and the ExecuComp firm sample from 1993 to 2009. Stock price crash is defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
 Compustat universe ExecuComp firms 
Fiscal year No. of firms 
No. of firms with 
price crash 
Percentage of 
firms with 
price crash No. of firms 
No. of firms with 
price crash 
Percentage of 
firms with 
price crash 
1993 5,360 825 0.154 1,553 317 0.204 
1994 5,832 805 0.138 1,648 264 0.160 
1995 6,698 864 0.129 1,719 239 0.139 
1996 6,942 847 0.122 1,819 249 0.137 
1997 7,405 948 0.128 1,870 271 0.145 
1998 7,436 1,331 0.179 1,910 346 0.181 
1999 6,888 895 0.130 1,811 261 0.144 
2000 6,746 1,012 0.150 1,736 286 0.165 
2001 6,498 1,443 0.222 1,754 488 0.278 
2002 6,091 993 0.163 1,777 313 0.176 
2003 5,709 788 0.138 1,813 268 0.148 
2004 5,553 944 0.170 1,765 302 0.171 
2005 5,503 980 0.178 1,678 302 0.180
2006 5,414 812 0.150 1,784 266 0.147 
2007 5,228 941 0.180 1,700 303 0.170 
2008 5,051 1,374 0.272 1,520 474 0.276 
2009 4,646 362 0.078 1,482 93 0.063 
Total 103,000 16,164 0.157 29,638 5,040 0.170 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics on stock price crash risk, executive compensation, and control 
variables. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with nonmissing values for the 
incentive ratio measures and all control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
Panel A: Sample of firm-years with available CEO equity incentive information 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Crash risk measures         
CRASH t 22,612 0.172 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NCSKEW t 22,610 0.034 0.693 -1.823 -0.356 -0.001 0.380 1.238 
DUVOL t 22,610 0.004 0.332 -0.798 -0.217 -0.003 0.215 0.572 
CEO compensation variables         
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 22,612 0.113 0.146 0.000 0.015 0.066 0.152 0.401 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 22,452 0.044 0.127 -0.339 -0.013 0.015 0.080 0.297 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 21,267 0.160 0.235 0.000 0.017 0.053 0.187 0.755 
BONUS_CEO t-1 22,514 0.853 1.207 0.000 0.000 0.563 1.095 2.712 
 
Other control variables         
DTURN t-1 22,612 0.009 0.073 -0.246 -0.014 0.005 0.029 0.131 
NCSKEW t-1 22,612 0.054 0.666 -1.608 -0.341 0.003 0.383 1.248 
SIGMA t-1 22,612 0.053 0.028 0.016 0.033 0.046 0.065 0.108 
RET t-1 22,612 -0.173 0.202 -1.152 -0.207 -0.104 -0.053 -0.022 
SIZE t-1 22,612 7.032 1.570 3.221 5.968 6.949 8.065 9.755 
MB t-1 22,612 3.121 2.766 0.484 1.547 2.278 3.617 8.340 
LEV t-1 22,612 0.325 0.243 0.000 0.100 0.323 0.503 0.740 
ROA t 22,612 0.048 0.105 -0.390 0.016 0.050 0.096 0.194 
ABACC t-1 22,612 0.052 0.062 0.001 0.015 0.034 0.067 0.164 
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Panel B: Sample of firm-years with both CEO and CFO equity incentive information 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Crash risk measures         
CRASH t 17,367 0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NCSKEW t 17,366 0.038 0.695 -1.859 -0.352 0.004 0.390 1.249 
DUVOL t 17,366 0.007 0.334 -0.808 -0.215 0.000 0.219 0.578 
CEO compensation variables         
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 17,367 0.115 0.148 0.000 0.016 0.067 0.154 0.405 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 17,264 0.047 0.126 -0.295 -0.012 0.016 0.081 0.300 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 16,403 0.154 0.228 0.000 0.016 0.051 0.179 0.729 
BONUS_CEO t-1 17,288 0.818 1.130 0.000 0.000 0.550 1.087 2.516 
CFO compensation variables         
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 17,367 0.072 0.093 0.000 0.013 0.043 0.096 0.241 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 17,264 0.023 0.071 -0.131 -0.012 0.004 0.042 0.162 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1 16,020 0.037 0.081 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.036 0.148 
BONUS_CFO t-1 17,351 0.565 0.652 0.000 0.060 0.427 0.790 1.667 
Other control variables         
DTURN t-1 17,367 0.010 0.075 -0.246 -0.014 0.005 0.031 0.136 
NCSKEW t-1 17,367 0.055 0.670 -1.623 -0.338 0.006 0.389 1.251 
SIGMA t-1 17,367 0.053 0.028 0.016 0.033 0.047 0.066 0.110 
RET t-1 17,367 -0.177 0.208 -1.189 -0.211 -0.106 -0.054 -0.022 
SIZE t-1 17,367 6.963 1.521 3.284 5.945 6.886 7.958 9.592 
MB t-1 17,367 3.051 2.703 0.472 1.537 2.246 3.531 8.025 
LEV t-1 17,367 0.322 0.241 0.000 0.095 0.321 0.500 0.733 
ROA t 17,367 0.046 0.106 -0.396 0.015 0.050 0.095 0.193 
ABACC t-1 17,367 0.053 0.063 0.001 0.015 0.035 0.067 0.166 
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Table 3 
Impact of executive equity incentives on stock price crash risk 
This table presents the results of the impact of executive equity incentives on stock price crash risk. 
The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with nonmissing values for all the incentive 
and control variables. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both 
firm and time. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Logistic regression of CRASH on executive equity incentives 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.112 0.079  -0.209 
 (0.61) (0.38)  (-0.86) 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.552** 0.757** 
   (2.07) (2.24) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.072 0.029  0.033 
 (0.70) (0.22)  (0.25) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   -0.228 -0.299 
   (-0.66) (-0.83) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.005 -0.012  -0.044* 
 (0.24) (-0.44)  (-1.69) 
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.028 0.076 
   (0.55) (1.60) 
DTURN t-1 0.627** 0.551 0.521 0.479 
 (2.21) (1.57) (1.37) (1.23) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.079*** 0.078** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (3.11) (2.25) (2.71) (2.62) 
SIGMA t-1 15.069*** 16.570*** 15.816*** 15.769*** 
 (2.64) (3.12) (2.88) (2.84) 
RET t-1 2.244** 2.260*** 2.197** 2.177** 
 (2.50) (2.66) (2.51) (2.49) 
SIZE t-1 -0.021 0.003 -0.017 -0.011
 (-0.78) (0.08) (-0.52) (-0.31) 
MB t-1 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.40) (0.08) (0.09) 
LEV t-1 -0.154 -0.197* -0.129 -0.141 
 (-1.05) (-1.66) (-1.01) (-1.15) 
ROA t -0.784*** -0.850*** -0.858*** -0.815*** 
 (-3.72) (-3.41) (-3.33) (-2.99) 
ABACC t-1 0.238 -0.045 -0.155 -0.047 
 (0.68) (-0.10) (-0.37) (-0.11) 
Constant -1.762*** -2.340*** -1.985*** -2.301*** 
 (-7.23) (-4.06) (-4.21) (-3.98)
No. of observations 21,166 16,319 15,997 15,763 
Pseudo-R2 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 
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Panel B: OLS regression of NCSKEW on executive equity incentives 
 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.129*** 0.097*  -0.009 
 (2.61) (1.66)  (-0.14) 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.267*** 0.278*** 
   (2.81) (2.91) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.006 0.013  0.012 
 (0.18) (0.35)  (0.33) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   -0.026 -0.037 
   (-0.29) (-0.42) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.011** 0.008  -0.000 
 (2.11) (1.54) (-0.08)
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.019* 0.018 
   (1.74) (1.38) 
DTURN t-1 0.251*** 0.245*** 0.249*** 0.222*** 
 (4.20) (3.33) (3.06) (2.60) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 (0.79) (0.39) (0.76) (0.64) 
SIGMA t-1 2.376 2.294 2.166 2.147 
 (1.48) (1.43) (1.33) (1.32) 
RET t-1 0.464** 0.417* 0.400* 0.399* 
 (2.05) (1.90) (1.84) (1.83) 
SIZE t-1 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.017** 0.018*** 
 (2.79) (3.04) (2.53) (2.67) 
MB t-1 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (2.83) (3.75) (3.22) (3.02) 
LEV t-1 -0.105*** -0.131*** -0.126*** -0.123*** 
 (-4.43) (-6.34) (-4.79) (-5.03) 
ROA t 0.058 0.018 -0.002 0.015 
 (0.99) (0.29) (-0.02) (0.22) 
ABACC t-1 0.116* 0.074 0.030 0.059 
 (1.77) (0.89) (0.35) (0.70) 
Constant -0.201** -0.249 -0.219 -0.240 
 (-2.33) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-1.59) 
No. of observations 21,179 16,333 16,011 15,777 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 
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Panel C: OLS regression of DUVOL on executive equity incentives 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.060*** 0.046  -0.005 
 (2.64) (1.63)  (-0.17) 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.124** 0.131** 
   (2.47) (2.46) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 -0.002 0.001  0.001 
 (-0.11) (0.07)  (0.08) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   -0.009 -0.011 
   (-0.21) (-0.27) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.005* 0.004  -0.000 
 (1.95) (1.59)  (-0.14) 
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.010* 0.010 
   (1.85) (1.34) 
DTURN t-1 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.119***
 (4.58) (3.82) (3.31) (2.87) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.46) (0.18) (0.46) (0.29) 
SIGMA t-1 0.857 0.856 0.819 0.815 
 (1.05) (1.08) (1.03) (1.03) 
RET t-1 0.192* 0.175 0.170 0.169 
 (1.70) (1.62) (1.61) (1.60) 
SIZE t-1 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (3.34) (3.73) (3.11) (3.29) 
MB t-1 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003** 
 (2.47) (3.10) (2.69) (2.54) 
LEV t-1 -0.047*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 (-3.95) (-4.99) (-3.72) (-3.84) 
ROA t 0.062** 0.047* 0.039 0.047 
 (2.18) (1.75) (1.23) (1.62) 
ABACC t-1 0.052* 0.039 0.021 0.033 
 (1.67) (0.99) (0.54) (0.85) 
Constant -0.095** -0.116 -0.106* -0.115 
 (-2.40) (-1.60) (-1.72) (-1.64) 
No. of observations 21,179 16,333 16,011 15,777 
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 
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Table 4 
Impact of abnormal executive option incentives 
This table presents the results of the impact of abnormal executive option incentives on stock price 
crash risk. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with nonmissing values for the option 
incentive ratio measure and all the control variables. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Logistic regression of CRASH on executive equity incentives 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.250 0.130  -0.094 
 (1.27) (0.61)  (-0.38) 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.632** 0.732* 
   (2.12) (1.85) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.079 0.030  0.031 
 (0.78) (0.24)  (0.24) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   -0.214 -0.275 
   (-0.62) (-0.76) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.004 -0.010  -0.036 
 (0.17) (-0.36)  (-1.32) 
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.020 0.061 
   (0.39) (1.25) 
DTURN t-1 0.589** 0.514 0.489 0.452 
 (2.01) (1.45) (1.28) (1.17) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.079*** 0.079** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
 (3.01) (2.25) (2.69) (2.61) 
SIGMA t-1 15.092** 16.259*** 15.713*** 15.526*** 
 (2.55) (2.99) (2.83) (2.76) 
RET t-1 2.264** 2.233*** 2.184** 2.152** 
 (2.44) (2.60) (2.48) (2.46)
SIZE t-1 -0.021 0.002 -0.013 -0.009 
 (-0.81) (0.06) (-0.40) (-0.27) 
MB t-1 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.04) (0.31) (0.28) (0.24) 
LEV t-1 -0.137 -0.186 -0.142 -0.146 
 (-0.94) (-1.57) (-1.17) (-1.23) 
ROA t -0.772*** -0.833*** -0.844*** -0.795*** 
 (-3.59) (-3.21) (-3.17) (-2.82) 
ABACC t-1 0.255 -0.033 -0.143 -0.037 
 (0.72) (-0.08) (-0.34) (-0.08) 
Constant -1.769*** -2.324*** -1.994*** -2.290***
 (-6.13) (-3.85) (-4.01) (-3.76) 
No. of observations 21,023 16,222 15,904 15,672 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 
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Panel B: OLS regression of NCSKEW on executive equity incentives 
 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.117** 0.078  0.018 
 (2.20) (1.41)  (0.28) 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.227** 0.219* 
   (2.28) (1.93) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.013 0.016  0.015 
 (0.40) (0.44)  (0.41) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   -0.006 -0.017 
   (-0.06) (-0.20) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.009* 0.007  0.000 
 (1.75) (1.34)  (0.08) 
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.015 0.013 
   (1.41) (1.01) 
DTURN t-1 0.241*** 0.235*** 0.241*** 0.214*** 
 (4.06) (3.30) (3.07) (2.61) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.006 
 (0.71) (0.32) (0.67) (0.54) 
SIGMA t-1 2.537 2.424 2.313 2.282 
 (1.58) (1.51) (1.43) (1.42) 
RET t-1 0.478** 0.426* 0.409* 0.408* 
 (2.10) (1.96) (1.90) (1.89) 
SIZE t-1 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (3.38) (3.48) (3.11) (3.19) 
MB t-1 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (2.96) (3.69) (3.70) (3.43) 
LEV t-1 -0.110*** -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.132*** 
 (-4.63) (-6.21) (-5.19) (-5.46) 
ROA t 0.061 0.025 0.009 0.023 
 (1.02) (0.38) (0.12) (0.32) 
ABACC t-1 0.117* 0.070 0.029 0.056 
 (1.73) (0.82) (0.33) (0.66) 
Constant -0.225*** -0.273* -0.245** -0.264* 
 (-2.98) (-1.91) (-1.99) (-1.89) 
No. of observations 21,037 16,236 15,918 15,686 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 
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Panel C: OLS regression of DUVOL on executive equity incentives 
 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 0.055** 0.041  0.012 
 (2.20) (1.52)  (0.39) 
ABINCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1   0.109** 0.101* 
   (2.07) (1.70) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.002 0.003 0.003
 (0.11) (0.18)  (0.18) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.04) (-0.02) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 0.004 0.004  -0.000 
 (1.60) (1.36)  (-0.01) 
BONUS_CFO t-1   0.008 0.007 
   (1.50) (1.01) 
DTURN t-1 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.116*** 
 (4.45) (3.80) (3.34) (2.90) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.39) (0.10) (0.35) (0.18) 
SIGMA t-1 0.935 0.918 0.887 0.879 
 (1.15) (1.17) (1.12) (1.12) 
RET t-1 0.198* 0.179* 0.174* 0.173* 
 (1.76) (1.67) (1.67) (1.66) 
SIZE t-1 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (3.96) (4.29) (3.68) (3.82) 
MB t-1 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (2.63) (3.06) (3.04) (2.84) 
LEV t-1 -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.057*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.99) (-4.20) (-4.28) 
ROA t 0.064** 0.050* 0.044 0.051* 
 (2.22) (1.82) (1.38) (1.71) 
ABACC t-1 0.053* 0.037 0.020 0.031 
 (1.65) (0.92) (0.52) (0.81) 
Constant -0.107*** -0.129* -0.120** -0.129* 
 (-3.07) (-1.89) (-2.09) (-1.94) 
No. of observations 21,037 16,236 15,918 15,686
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 
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Table 5 
Subsample analysis: the effects of product market competition 
This table presents the results of the subsample analysis of the impact of executive equity 
incentives on stock price crash risk. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with 
nonmissing values for all the incentive and control variables. The low product market competition 
subsample includes firms with above-median Herfindahl–Hirschman indexes and the high product market 
competition subsample includes firms with below-median Herfindahl–Hirschman indexes. The t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
  
 CRASH NCSKEW DUVOL 
 Product market competition Product market competition Product market competition 
 Low High Low High Low High 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 -0.469* 0.045 -0.066 0.037 -0.037 0.022 
 (-1.65) (0.14) (-0.88) (0.47) (-1.10) (0.54) 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 1.169*** 0.422 0.489*** 0.120 0.222*** 0.064 
 (2.74) (0.74) (3.45) (0.84) (2.93) (0.85) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.013 0.055 0.012 0.008 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.08) (0.26) (0.31) (0.16) (0.32) (-0.27) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1 -0.737* -0.006 -0.063 -0.035 -0.022 -0.009 
 (-1.85) (-0.02) (-0.52) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.18) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 -0.064 -0.026 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.10) (-0.60) (0.13) (-0.27) (0.12) (-0.34) 
BONUS_CFO t-1 0.153*** 0.011 0.031* 0.005 0.015* 0.003 
 (2.64) (0.14) (1.81) (0.33) (1.65) (0.40) 
DTURN t-1 0.505 0.483 0.233* 0.223** 0.145** 0.102** 
 (1.05) (0.76) (1.96) (2.24) (2.40) (2.44) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.133*** 0.069 0.003 0.013 0.001 0.003 
 (4.11) (1.14) (0.24) (0.73) (0.10) (0.37) 
SIGMA t-1 11.975** 18.124** 0.499 3.516* 0.193 1.339 
 (2.01) (2.26) (0.23) (1.90) (0.19) (1.47) 
RET t-1 1.603** 2.457** 0.188 0.558** 0.087 0.233** 
 (2.12) (1.99) (0.70) (2.39) (0.71) (2.03)
SIZE t-1 -0.017 -0.005 0.018* 0.018*** 0.011** 0.009** 
 (-0.33) (-0.13) (1.75) (2.69) (2.56) (2.57) 
MB t-1 0.021* -0.011 0.009*** 0.007* 0.004** 0.003 
 (1.68) (-0.75) (2.80) (1.66) (2.41) (1.57) 
LEV t-1 -0.252 -0.108 -0.159*** -0.094** -0.072*** -0.035* 
 (-1.44) (-0.64) (-4.41) (-2.25) (-4.11) (-1.69) 
ROA t -1.576*** -0.460 -0.043 0.011 0.024 0.043 
 (-3.74) (-1.37) (-0.26) (0.12) (0.32) (1.00) 
ABACC t-1 -0.034 -0.066 0.070 0.068 0.052 0.025 
 (-0.05) (-0.11) (0.49) (0.55) (0.83) (0.46) 
Constant -2.561*** -0.608 -0.244 0.290*** -0.130 0.112***
 (-3.68) (-1.08) (-1.32) (3.02) (-1.57) (2.90) 
No. of observations 7,869 7,889 7,884 7,893 7,884 7,893 
Pseudo-/Adjusted R2 0.047 0.037 0.037 0.049 0.041 0.054 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on 
 
 
 
  
  
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 
Chi squared =1.31 
 (p-value =0.253) 
Chi squared =0.82 
 (p-value =0.367) 
Chi squared =1.13 
 (p-value =0.287) 
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INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 
Chi squared =1.09 
 (p-value =0.298)
Chi squared =4.09 
(p-value =0.043)
Chi squared =3.26 
 (p-value =0.071)
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Table 6 
Executive option portfolio vega and crash risk 
This table presents the results of the impact of option deltas and option vegas on stock price crash 
risk. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with nonmissing values for the option 
incentive ratio measure and all the control variables. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both firm and time. All the control variables in Table 5 are included but not 
reported for conciseness. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
Sample with CEO 
equity incentive info 
Sample with both CEO and CFO 
equity incentive info 
 (1) CEO (2) CEO (3) CFO (4) CEO vs. CFO 
 
Logistic regression of CRASH 
 
OPTDELTA_CEO t-1 0.009 0.083  -0.202 
 (0.23) (0.78)  (-1.42) 
OPTDELTA _CFO t-1   0.338** 0.442** 
   (2.31) (2.14) 
OPTVEGA_CEO t-1 0.004 0.027  0.099 
 (0.08) (0.26)  (0.69) 
OPTVEGA _CFO t-1   -0.142 -0.123 
   (-0.89) (-0.59) 
 
OLS regression of NCSKEW 
 
OPTDELTA_CEO t-1 0.038*** 0.031**  0.011 
 (3.32) (2.37) (0.68)
OPTDELTA _CFO t-1   0.045*** 0.035* 
   (2.85) (1.86) 
OPTVEGA_CEO t-1 -0.030** -0.022  -0.006 
 (-2.36) (-1.54)  (-0.34) 
OPTVEGA _CFO t-1   -0.033** -0.027 
   (-1.97) (-1.22) 
 
OLS regression of DUVOL 
 
OPTDELTA_CEO t-1 0.017*** 0.015**  0.006 
 (3.04) (2.22)  (0.77) 
OPTDELTA _CFO t-1   0.021** 0.016* 
   (2.57) (1.74) 
OPTVEGA_CEO t-1 -0.014** -0.010  -0.003 
 (-2.13) (-1.40)  (-0.38) 
OPTVEGA _CFO t-1   -0.015* -0.012 
   (-1.77) (-1.16) 
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Table 7 
Masking risk taking: subsamples cut by financial leverage 
This table presents the results of the subsample analysis on the impact of executive equity 
incentives on stock price crash risk. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2009 with 
nonmissing values for all the incentive and control variables. The high-leverage subsample includes firm-
years with above-median financial leverage, and the low-leverage subsample includes firm-years with 
below-median financial leverage. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by both firm and time. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Here *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 CRASH NCSKEW DUVOL 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage 
 High Low High Low High Low 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 -0.649* 0.035 -0.095 0.037 -0.047 0.015 
 (-1.68) (0.13) (-1.23) (0.47) (-1.25) (0.37) 
INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 1.578** 0.200 0.504*** 0.093 0.234*** 0.047 
 (2.53) (0.50) (3.65) (0.73) (2.90) (0.67) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CEO t-1 0.085 0.003 0.059 -0.014 0.018 -0.006 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.85) (-0.37) (0.55) (-0.35) 
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO t-1 0.027 -0.432 0.022 -0.064 0.049 -0.041 
 (0.05) (-1.01) (0.13) (-0.61) (0.59) (-0.78) 
BONUS_CEO t-1 -0.078 -0.017 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.59) (-0.44) (-0.28) (0.06) (-0.18) (-0.22) 
BONUS_CFO t-1 0.133* 0.028 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.009 
 (1.84) (0.34) (1.13) (0.92) (1.14) (0.94) 
DTURN t-1 -0.867 1.009*** 0.001 0.287*** 0.067 0.123*** 
 (-1.46) (2.82) (0.01) (4.92) (0.80) (3.87) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.190*** 0.018 0.019 -0.008 0.005 -0.004 
 (4.06) (0.32) (1.56) (-0.48) (0.80) (-0.54) 
SIGMA t-1 2.945 22.700*** -0.839 5.007*** -0.600 2.246*** 
 (0.46) (2.98) (-0.41) (3.45) (-0.58) (3.63) 
RET t-1 0.759 2.896*** 0.083 0.674*** 0.026 0.303*** 
 (0.88) (2.62) (0.33) (3.57) (0.19) (3.69) 
SIZE t-1 -0.006 -0.012 0.017** 0.019* 0.009** 0.010** 
 (-0.14) (-0.31) (2.18) (1.93) (2.30) (2.20) 
MB t-1 -0.005 0.012 0.008** 0.011*** 0.003* 0.006*** 
 (-0.38) (0.87) (1.99) (3.38) (1.70) (3.28) 
LEV t-1 -0.220 -0.433 -0.265*** -0.092 -0.109*** -0.012 
 (-0.64) (-1.00) (-3.71) (-0.92) (-3.39) (-0.28) 
ROA t -1.906*** -0.465 -0.192 0.064 -0.028 0.060** 
 (-4.36) (-1.64) (-1.16) (1.09) (-0.44) (2.36) 
ABACC t-1 -0.504 0.177 0.038 0.084 0.027 0.042 
 (-0.90) (0.38) (0.29) (0.69) (0.41) (0.65) 
Constant -0.874* -19.425*** 0.123 -0.588*** 0.044 -0.274*** 
 (-1.68) (-14.20) (0.61) (-3.20) (0.47) (-2.83) 
No. of observations 7,877 7,824 7,913 7,864 7,913 7,864 
Pseudo-/Adjusted R2 0.056 0.030 0.057 0.025 0.061 0.032 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on 
 
 
 
  
  
INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO t-1 
Chi squared =2.01 
 (p-value =0.156) 
Chi squared =1.17 
 (p-value =0.280) 
Chi squared =1.08 
 (p-value =0.300) 
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INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO t-1 
Chi squared =3.34 
 (p-value =0.068) 
Chi squared =4.67 
 (p-value =0.031) 
Chi squared =4.23 
 (p-value =0.040) 
 
